Does Moore Successfully Refute The Skeptic s Argument

Student Number: 2121206 Professor Kisolo-Ssonko Knowledge and Justification 22 October 2015 Does Moore Successfully Refute the Skeptic’s Argument? I. Introduction In his paper â€Å"Proof of an External World,† G. E. Moore discusses what exactly defines an external world, and how we can know that one exists. He addresses Kant, who laments the following: â€Å"It still remains a scandal to philosophy†¦that the existence of things outside of us†¦must be accepted merely on faith, and that, if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.† Kant does not actually seem to be a skeptic, but rather a philosopher wishing for factual proof of an external world. Moore presents, in his paper, exactly the evidence that Kant is searching for, in a clear and simple argument that seems to answer ‘the skeptic’s’ main concern as well. There are many variations of skeptical arguments against the existence of an external world, but we can more generally define ‘the skeptic’ as someone who does not believe that it is possible to have adequate justification for a knowledge claim—in this case, knowledge claims about an external world’s existence. In other words, they claim no one can know anything for certain, even about the existence of the world around us. Moore’s argument, however, makes skeptics’ concerns seem rather silly, compared to his sensible, much more obvious points. But since his publication, other philosophers skeptical of Moore’s